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Meanwhile, pro-Russian rebels mobilized into attempting 
to take hold of Ukraine. Estonia, Lithuania and Poland were 
particularly vocal in condemning violence against the pro-
test, while reactions from the Southern Central European 
countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Czech Republic and 
Hungary) were more reserved. Third, Russian troops annexed 
Crimea in March 2014. The EU responded by imposing sanc-
tions on Russia, which are likely to stay in effect until Russia 
implements the Minsk agreement. The principle of national 
sovereignty and Ukrainian independence, embodied in the 
Helsinki Accords, the Paris charter and the Budapest Memo-
randum, were violated, while Putin legitimized the annexa-
tion by claiming that Crimea had a right to self-determination 
and democratically chose the Russian path in a parliamen-
tary vote and referendum.1  
These developments together were a fundamental challenge 
to the EU’s approach to Russia and its neighborhood.  First, 
with the military intervention in Ukraine and a number of 
explicit political statements, Putin challenged the European 
security order that had been taken for granted since the 
end of the Cold War. Countries in Northern central Europe 
became acutely aware of their own security threats vis-à-vis 
Russia. Second, Russia revealed its strategic interest in the 
region and its determination to build up an alternative model 
of regional integration with violent means. So the EU had to 
give up the idea of Russia being a strategic partner not only 
to the EU, but in particular by a number of EU member states 
which maintained close economic and political relationships 
with Russia. Third, the case of Ukraine showed the degree to 
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Russia’s military attacks in Ukraine are not only an assault 
on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of one of the Euro-
pean Union’s largest neighbours. They also impose multiple 
important challenges to the European Union (EU). Moscow 
has questioned the architecture, rules and institutions of the 
European post-Cold War security order and forces the EU to 
reconsider its external policies, particularly in its Eastern 
neighbourhood. Reactions of EU member governments, of 
certain political parties and media have exposed the EU’s 
vulnerability to Russian influence, which risks undermining 
the EU’s ability to forge an impactful approach to Russia and 
the EU’s eastern neighborhood.
Unprepared for the unacceptable
In 2013 and early 2014, the European Union had to face 
three unexpected developments. First, the Summit in Vilnius 
did not conclude with the expected signing of an Association 
Agreement (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA) with Ukraine, while European leaders 
had anticipated the culmination of a five-year negotiation 
process. Then-President Yanokovych’s U-turn was largely a 
product of counteroffers and threats from Moscow, the impact 
of which had been underestimated. Second, Ukraine’s deci-
sion to withdraw from the AA/DCFTA in November 2013 
resulted in a sudden protest movement against Yanukovych’s 
volte-face and for stronger ties to the EU, which came to be 
known as the “Euromaidan.” The discontent ran deeper than 
the failed Association Agreement, and demonstrated a hun-
ger for economic and political reforms in a country saddled 
with economic woes and corruption. With Russian backing, 
the Ukrainian government ordered military troops to open 
fire on protesters, after which Yanukovych was forced to 
flee the country and an interim government was installed. 
1 ARD-Exklusivinterview, ‘Nicht gegen Völkerrecht verstoßen,’ November 
17, 2014,   http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/putin-interview-111.html
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which Russian threats and pressure could have an impact on 
Eastern partnership countries and this well beyond Ukraine. 
The EU has to deal with brutal competition of influence in its 
Eastern neighbourhood in which countries can be in a situa-
tion of war and violent destabilization.
Inability to surprise
National and EU decision makers struggled to grasp the 
dyna mics, potential and regional implications of Russian 
aggres sion as well as the principal nature of the conflict, 
and the EU’s and member state reactions have hardly been 
unex pected. The EU’s competencies and decision-making 
struc tures in foreign policy, security and defense matters do 
not lend itself to quick joint reactions under unpredictable 
circumstances. It was hence a substantial political success 
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Council to reach 
an agreement on sanctions through decision (2011/486/
CFSP) on 17 March 2014, the same day Crimea formally 
announced its independence. Closing the ranks around sub-
sequent rounds of sanctions against Russia, not only in the 
EU, but also in the transatlantic relationship, has proven a 
difficult, but a so far manageable challenge. Meanwhile, the 
political leadership on negotiations with Moscow and Kiev 
was assured by a small group of member states, starting out 
with the Weimar Triangle, and then pursued only by Paris 
and Berlin.
The scope of possible reactions from the EU and the US is 
thereby expectedly much narrower than the instruments 
used by a Russia which is willing to break international 
law and use military means in its efforts to destabilize its 
neighborhood. Early on, the use of military force to retaliate 
against Russian aggression towards Crimea was excluded by 
a number of relevant actors, such as the German chancellor, 
the US government and also the incoming EU High Repre-
sentative.2 Hence, Moscow can assume the EU to mainly be 
reactive and the price of destabilization and its using of hard 
power is more calculable.
Dependency on Russia
Part of the complexity of European decision-making is due 
to strongly varying EU member interests in the Eastern 
neigh borhood, coupled with vastly different patterns of 
dependency on Russia. A group of countries led by Poland 
and the Baltics assessed the events in Ukraine early on as 
a hard security threat that would require a determined and 
joint response, including an involvement of NATO. There 
are secondly countries like Portugal, Spain, France or Italy 
which traditionally have little strategic interest in the EU’s 
Eastern neighborhood and, to varying degrees, attempted to 
reach a constructive relationship with Russia based on close 
business ties. As the second-largest trading partner with Rus-
sia in the EU, Italy was accused of blocking tougher sanction 
on Russia due to its own economic interests in particular as 
Italian energy policy hinged on a strategic partnership with 
Russia.3 France, for its part, meanwhile initially hesitated 
to withdraw from its contractual obligation from 2011 to 
deliver its Mistral Class assault ships commissioned by Rus-
sia in a €1.2 billion deal. Upon rising pressure, however, 
France’s President Francois Hollande suspended the agree-
ment until an actual ceasefire and a political settlement has 
taken place in Ukraine. The German government took on a 
particular role, leading efforts to negotiate with Moscow and 
Kiev in cooperation with France. Initially, it found it hard to 
abandon its long-held policy on a ‘Modernization Partner-
ship,’ which was based on the assumption that economic 
and political engagement with Russia would eventually con-
tribute to transforming Russia politically. 
The perceived vulnerability to potential Russian energy cuts 
and the trade relationships established between EU coun-
tries and Russia imposes costs on those member states with 
strong business ties with Russia and a high energy depend-
ency. Imports from Russia are dominated by oil and gas, with 
dependency varying from state to state (Germany imports 
40% of its gas from Russia, while Italy France and the UK 
import less than 20 %.)4  Russia also imposed a one year ban 
on food products stemming from the EU and the US, which 
were worth a total of $8.7 billion in 2013.5 The losses for 
European food producers are compounded by Europe’s slow 
economic growth. 
On top of dependency on Russian energy provision, trade 
and financial relationships with Russia and hence vulner-
ability to sanctions and counter sanctions, geographic prox-
imity and the experience of Soviet rule are generally seen 
as impacting the governments’ positioning on an adequate 
response to the conflict. However, the Central and Eastern 
European countries are not all particularly engaged for a 
hard stance on Moscow. So even those EU members located 
in close geographical proximity to both of the conflicting 
countries, share a history of Soviet occupation, and are par-
ticularly sensitive and exposed to developments in Eastern 
Europe and Russia have differed significantly in their percep-
tions of and reactions to the crisis.6 Whether handling the 
Ukraine crisis in the short-term or the Russian challenge in 
the long run, Europe will be hard-pressed to muster a shared 
understanding of the problem, a strong commitment to its 
founding principles and values, and sustainable policies for 
its Eastern neighbors.  
2 Kadri Liik, ‘The real problem with Mogherini’s Russia paper,’ European 
Council on Foreign Relation, January 20, 2015, http://www.ecfr.eu/arti-
cle/commentary_the_real_problem_with_mogherinis_russia_paper402.
3 For instance, the Italian energy group ENI was one of the major investor’s 
in Russia’s former South-Stream pipeline project and the Italian bank 
UniCredit is the second-largest foreign bank in Russia by revenues.
4 Harrison Jacobs, ‘These 4 charts illustrate Russia’s gas leverage over Eu-
rope,’ Business Insider UK, February 2, 2015, http://uk.businessinsider.
com/russias-gas-leverage-over-europe-2015-2?r=US. 
5 Matthew Dalton and Marcus Walker, ‘Russian Import Ban Will Hit Europe-
an Food Producers,’ The Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2014, http://www.
wsj.com/articles/eu-mulls-further-action-after-russian-ban-1407414110.
6  Joerg Forbrig, ‘A Region Disunited? Central European Responses to the 
314 · 2015
Domestic fragilities
Russia’s interference has gone far beyond its neighborhood. 
Central European countries, whether the Eastern-most 
members of the EU and NATO or the accession candidates 
in the Western Balkans, in particular experience deliberate 
destabilization by Moscow. The same phenomenon, albeit 
to less important degrees, can be seen in Western Europe. 
Moscow tries to gain leverage over public debates and deci-
sion making through covert support for political parties, 
campaigns and strategic investments, such as for infrastruc-
ture. In a number of EU member states, including Germany, 
Moscow has established media like Russia Today, which can 
be classified as propaganda outlets. Russian money spon-
sors extremist parties and NGOs, seemingly in an attempt to 
undermine moves towards deeper European or transatlantic 
cooperation, for instance TTIP, and woos key businesses. 
Meanwhile, the rise of populist, anti-establishment parties 
throughout Europe as a political consequence of years of eco-
nomic crisis and dire social situations, adds domestic friction 
over the question how to deal with Russia, which attracts 
sympathizers to its anti-establishment and conservative 
values. The rise of anti-establishment movements is indeed 
an important entry gate for Russian interference within the 
EU which may make Europe less able to forge compromise, 
while Russia attempts to gain support for its narrative in the 
EU and its neighborhood.
The need to review its neighbourhood policy
In this situation of internal fragility, the EU has to review 
its neighborhood policy which clearly has not yielded the 
expected progress in stabilizing the countries concerned, ten 
years after its inception. The EU underestimated the extent to 
which its world vision clashed with Russia’s own geopolitical 
aspirations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus and 
which forms a direct competition with Russia over the neigh-
boring countries could take. Today, it has to recognize that not 
all states seek close relations with the EU. The EU will need 
to invest more and choose a more tailor-made approach to 
individual neighboring countries, approaching both govern-
ments, civil society and the business sector to support transi-
tion and economic developments where there is a demand.7  
Dealing with hard security issues
Also, the EU will have to revisit the question how to integrate 
a stronger security dimension into its approach to its Eastern 
neighborhood, especially in light of the failed implementa-
tion of the Minsk agreements. The conflict with Russia has 
reminded Europe of the extent to which its security remains 
to be linked with NATO, which, given its mandate, is itself 
restricted to act. Without the ability to stabilize its neighbor-
hood via its customary normative approach, in particular 
as EU and Nato enlargement is currently off the table, the 
absence of a “security roof” makes efforts to stabilize socie-
ties and economies and to support the transition an almost 
impossible task, in particular as investors seek a certain set 
parameters in the field of security. A “security dialogue” 
on the governmental level, both between the EU and the 
six EaP countries and with each of them individually could 
be an important building block to strengthen the stabilisa-
tion efforts in Europe’s East, and to potentially prepare the 
grounds for closer cooperation in the field of security.
The issue of hard vs. soft power has also moved to the center 
of the transatlantic debate. The Munich Security Conference 
in early February 2015 demonstrated the extent to which 
opinions on the delivery of lethal arms diverge. While US 
President Barack Obama is still weighing his options, a grow-
ing number of Americans support sending arms to Kiev.8 The 
EU members themselves are divided on this issue. While the 
German government stresses the danger of escalating the 
war with lethal weapons, the former soviet and bordering 
states, in particular Poland and the Baltics, fear that Putin’s 
aggression will not simply end with Ukraine.9 Lithuania’s 
min istry of defense has already signed off on ‘elements of 
military weaponry’ for Ukraine, and urges other states to 
do so as well. As is the case with sanctions, the use of ‘hard 
power’ requires intense debates both within the Europe and 
the transatlantic relationship, so as to prevent divisions at a 
time when unity and strong leadership are crucial. 
 
Moving ahead with Energy Union
Attempts to forge joint threat perceptions and strategies 
towards Russia will only succeed if dependency on Rus-
sia is reduced. A key step is to create an EU energy union. 
While initially also conceived of as a tool to decrease prices, 
increase competition and promote sustainable develop-
ment,10 the energy security component has become the EU’s 
most important priority. The EU currently imports about 30% 
of its energy from Russia, with dependency in CEE states 
varying between 60% and 100% for some states.11  A high 
priority is to develop joint purchasing schemes for mem-
ber states, which would reduce dependence on Russia and 
could turn out to be the most important sanction Europe can 
implement.12 This would help depoliticize Gazprom’s current 
bilateral bargaining schemes, improve the negotiating power 
7 See also Žaneta Ozoliņa and Daniela Schwarzer (2015) ‘European Eastern 
Partnership: recommendations for a new approach,’ The German Mar-
shall Fund of the United States and the Latvian Transatlantic Organization, 
March 2015.
8 Pew Research Center, ‘Increased Public Support for the U.S. Arming 
Ukraine,’ February 23, 2015, http://www.people-press.org/2015/02/23/
increased-public-support-for-the-u-s-arming-ukraine/.
9 ‘Munich conference highlights splits over arming Ukraine,’ Financial 
Times, February 8, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/92fdbf70-af9f-
11e4-b42e-00144feab7de.html#slide0.
10 Sami Andoura et al., ‘Towards a European Energy Community: A Policy 
Proposal,’ Notre Europe, March 2010.
11 “Roadmap towards an Energy Union for Europe - Non-paper address-
ing the EU’s energy dependency challenges,” Permanent Representa-
tion of the Republic of Poland to the European Union in Brussels, April 
22, 2014, https://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/34efc44a-3b67-4f5e-b360-
ad7c71082604:JCR
12 Georgi Gotev, ‘Buzek: Energy independence is the best sanction against 
Russia,’ EurActiv, September 20, 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/sec-
tions/poland-ambitious-achievers/buzek-energy-independence-best-
sanction-against-russia-308331.
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of smaller states, and undue Gazprom’s monopoly in many 
Eastern member states.13 While the EU launched a blueprint 
for the energy union in February 2015, fundamental chal-
lenges remain in terms of structure, integration and political 
buy in. Currently there are far from enough interconnectors 
to pool resources for electricity and gas. The aging infrastruc-
ture needs to be expanded and modernized before markets 
can fully integrate. According to the International Energy 
Agency, the EU would need to spend $2.2tn until 2050 to 
replace the current infrastructure.14 In addition, the mix of 
energy sources widely varies from state to state due differ-
ences in geography, national policies, and technology. For 
instance, France relies mostly on nuclear power; Poland 
heavily uses coal; Germany seeks to use more renewables. 
Strongly diverging views on how to reach a secure, competi-
tive and sustainable energy policy and voiced sovereignty 
concerns show the need for intensified dialogue and consen-
sus building efforts around a project that is of key importance 
for the EU’s ability to act externally.
Looking ahead
The conflict between Russia and the West represents a reality 
check for the EU’s ability to act in face of a hard security chal-
lenge on its doorstep, for the willingness to defend Western 
liberal values both within the EU and in its neighborhood 
and for the degree of convergence and solidarity both within 
the EU and vis-à-vis the neighboring countries. Energy Union 
is one testing ground for its ability to compromise. The sta-
bilization the euro area and the cushioning of adjustment 
costs some countries are facing in such a way that political 
and social stability prevails, is a second. The EU’s ability to 
stop disintegrative trends triggered and furthered by anti-EU 
movements which may gain increasing support in a number 
of member states and which receive Russian backing, is key. 
Internal consensus on risk assessments, strategic options 
and long term goals with regards to Russia’s new assertive-
ness needs to be forged in order to increase the EU’s capacity 
to act externally. The EU’s ability to act in its own neighbor-
hood and its capacity to build consensus and maintain cohe-
sion are today as interconnected as never before.
13 Philipp Offenberg, ‘Taking stock of German Energy Policy in a European 
Context,’ Jacques Delors Institute. Policy Paper 116, August 29, 2015. 
14 ‘The case exists for forging an energy union in Europe,’ Financial Times, 
February 24, 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57c7688a-bc23-11e4-
b6ec-00144feab7de.html#axzz3TE7eueRd
